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Real Property-Changes in North Carolina's Foreclosure Law
In February 1975 a three-judge federal district court,' in Turner v.
Blackburn,2 held the North Carolina power of sale foreclosure statutes3
to be unconstitutional as applied. The court found that the statutes
violated procedural due process by failing to provide for personal notice
to the mortgagor and an opportunity to be heard prior to the deprivation
of his property by the foreclosure sale.4 This holding, which generated
much discussion among members of the bar, led to the passage by the
North Carolina General Assembly of a new statutory scheme providing,
among other things, for notice and hearing in such foreclosure proceedings.
TURNER V. BLACKBUN

Turner v. Blackburn involved the foreclosure of a deed of trust on
the property of plaintiff, Stella Turner, who had fallen behind in her
payments. Although plaintiff may have been contacted about her late
payments prior to the foreclosure proceedings, 6 she was not given personal notice of the foreclosure sale. 7 Notice of the sale, however, was posted
and published in conformity with the power of sale foreclosure statute.
Following the sale, the assignee of the highest bid, who had become the
owner of record, requested the clerk of the superior court to issue an
order of possession.9 Plaintiff then brought an action in federal court
claiming that the North Carolina procedure violated procedural due
1. The operation of a state statute may not be enjoined by a federal court on the
ground of unconstitutionality except by a three-judge federal court. 28 U.S.C. § 2281
(1970).
2. 389 F. Supp. 1250 (W.D.N.C. 1975).
3. The law then in force was N.C. GENr. STAT. §§ 45-21.1 to -21.33 (1966), as
amended, (Supp. 1974).
4. See also Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975), holding that a
sale of a motor vehicle by a garageman holding a possessory lien under N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 44A-1 to -6 (Supp. 1975), without the opportunity for a prior hearing to determine
the validity of the lien, violated due process.
5. Ch. 492, [1975] N.C. Sess. Laws, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT, §§ 45-21.9,
-21.16, -21.16A, -21.17, -21.21, -21.29, -21.30, -21.33, -21.45 (Supp. 1975).
6. Address by Charles D. Gray, IH, United Title Ins. Co. Seminar on Foreclosure, April 4, 1975.
7. Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1259 (W.D.N.C. 1975); Address by
Charles D. Gray, IH, United Title Ins. Co. Seminar on Foreclosure, April 4, 1975.
8. The applicable statute at that time was N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.17 (1966), as
amended, (Supp. 1974).
9. Pursuant to id. § 45-21.29(k) (Supp. 1974).
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process by failing to require personal notice and an opportunity to be
heard prior to the foreclosure sale."°
The federal court, in a two-to-one decision, held that the extensive
participation by the clerk of court required by statute"' constituted state
action and that notice and a hearing prior to a foreclosure sale were
constitutionally required unless effectively waived. The court further
found that the power of sale in the deed of trust was not an effective
waiver in this case since there was a disparity in bargaining power
between the parties to the deed of trust, the purported waiver was in
minute type, there was no evidence that plaintiff was aware of the legal
significance of the waiver language, and the deed of trust did not "even
allude to the right to a prior hearing" which it purportedly waived."2
The court ruled that, in the future, foreclosures pursuant to the North
Carolina statutes would be unlawful unless the clerk determined that
there was either a "knowing, voluntary, and intelligent waiver" or both
"adequate and timely notice"' 8 and "opportunity for a hearing."' 4
BACKGROND-STATE AND FEDERAL

Foreclosures were originally granted by courts of equity in order to
cut off the "equity of redemption"--the power of a mortgagor to pay his
debt and redeem his property after default. Although the original
"strict foreclosure," by which a court decrees title in the mortgagee, is
not recognized in North Carolina,' 5 North Carolina courts will grant a
foreclosure by ordering a sale.16 In contrast to both of these methods,
power of sale foreclosure arises not by authority of a court or statute, but
instead from the power of sale granted in a mortgage or deed of trust.
Power of sale foreclosure was recognized in North Carolina at least as
early as 183017 and is today the dominant method of foreclosing real
10. 389 F. Supp. at 1251-54.
11. See notes 83-100 and accompanying text infra.
12. 389 F. Supp. at 1258-61.
13. The court is slightly unclear whether this means "notice of sale" or "notice of
hearing," but the former interpretation is probably more in accord with the context. Of
course there can be no real opportunity for a hearing without notice of the hearing also.
14. 389 F. Supp. at 1261. With respect to the plaintiff, the court ordered the
owner of record to convey the property to Mrs. Turner in return for a mortgage to him.
Id. Judge Jones, dissenting, felt that there was not sufficient state action to give the
court jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970). 389 F. Supp. at 1261-63.
15. Bradburn v. Roberts, 148 N.C. 214, 61 S.E. 617 (1908); J.WnnsmTn, REAL
EsTATE AwiW NORTH CAR0rONA § 250 n.107 (1971).
16. J. WEBSTER, REAL EsTATE LAw IN NoRm CROLINA §§ 250-51 (1971).
17. Haines v. Cowles, 16 N.C. 420 (1830).
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property in North Carolina. It is quicker, simpler, and less expensive
8

than foreclosure by judicial sale.1
Prior to Turner the North Carolina statutes dealing with power of
sale foreclosure contained provisions that required the posting of the
notice of sale at the courthouse door for thirty days and the publication

of the notice in a newspaper once a week for four weeks, unless
otherwise agreed, but contained no provision for personal notice. 19 With
the exception of some dicta seemingly to the contrary,20 the North
Carolina courts had held for many years that personal notice is not
required to be given to either the debtor in default 2' or a junior lien
holder.22 This rule was reaffirmed in the 1972 case of Huggins v.
DeMent2 3 despite the contention by plaintiffs in that case that the failure

to give personal notice rendered the sale unconstitutional. Thus, Turner v. Blackburn was a complete reversal of the former North Carolina
law regarding personal notice in power of sale foreclosures.24
18. A further discussion of the types of foreclosures and other means of terminating the equity of redemption can be found in G. OsBoRNE, HANDBOOK ON =HELAW OF
MORTGAGES §§ 311-45 (2d ed. 1970); and in J.WEBsTER, REAL ESTATE LAW IN NORTH
CAROLiNA §§ 234, 243, 248-54 (1971).
19. N.C. GN. STAT. § 45-21.17 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
20. InMills v. Mutual Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 216 N.C. 664, 669, 6 S.E.2d 549, 552
(1940), the court in dictum stated, "The trustee . . .isbound . .. to . . . appris[e]
both [the debtor and the creditor] of the intention of selling, that each may take the
means to procure an advantageous sale." The court cited Johnston v. Eason, 38 N.C. 330
(1844), which stated, "When a trustee sells . . . , he must .. .give due notice to the
parties interested." Id. at 335. In Johnston, it was the mortgagee contesting a lack of notice. However, both Mills and Johnston cited Anon., 6 Madd. 10, 56 Eng. Rep. 992
(V.C.C. 1821), in which the court enjoined the trustee from selling since he had not informed the mortgagor of his intention to sell. In Capehart v. Kader Biggs & Co., 77 N.C.
261 (1877), the court stated that, in a mortgage containing a power of sale, omission of a
provision for notice to the mortgagor prior to advertisement for sale would "be imputed
to a purpose to oppress the mortgagor." Id. at 265. This statement, however, was
repudiated in later cases. See Manning v. Elliott Bros., 92 N.C. 48, 53 (1885); Bridgers
v. W.H. Morris & Sons, 90 N.C. 32, 36 (1884).
21. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Sanders, 264 N.C. 234, 241, 141 S.E.2d 329, 334
(1965); Woodell v. Davis, 261 N.C. 160, 163, 134 S.E.2d 160, 163 (1964); Biggs v.
Oxendine, 207 N.C. 601, 603-04, 178 S.E. 216, 217-18 (1935); McIver v. Smith, 118
N.C. 73, 75, 23 S.E. 971, 972 (1896); Huggins v. DeMent, 13 N.C. App. 673, 187
S.E.2d 412, appeal dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d 898, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1071
(1972), noted in 51 N.C.L. REv. 1110 (1973); Hodges v. Wellons, 9 N.C. App. 152,
156, 175 S.E.2d 690, 693 (1970).
22. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Sanders, 264 N.C. 234, 241, 141 S.E.2d 329, 334
(1965).
23. 13 N.C. App. 673, 187 S.E.2d 412, appeal dismissed, 281 N.C. 314, 188 S.E.2d
898, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1071 (1972). This case was criticized in Note, Notice
Requirements of the Non-judicial Foreclosure Sale, 51 N.C.L Ruv. 1110 (1973), which
predicted that the rule of Huggins might not stand.
24. Even since Turner v. Blackburn, the North Carolina Court. of Appeals has
continued to follow Huggins v. DeMent. Britt v. Britt, 26 N.C. App. 132, 137-38, 215
S.E.2d 172, 175-76, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 238, 217 S.E.2d 678 (1975).
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The Turner court based its decision upon the failure of the North
Carolina foreclosure procedure to meet the requirements of procedural

due process. Several United States Supreme Court decisions have discussed these requirements in the debtor-creditor context. In 1969, the
Supreme Court embarked on a line of cases holding that procedural due
process requires that a debtor be given an opportunity to be heard
before he can be deprived of property. In that year, Sniadach v. Family
Finance Corp.25 held that garnishment of a debtor's wages upon application by a creditor and before the debtor was given an opportunity to
challenge the issuance of the writ of garnishment violated due process.
The Court said that an opportunity to be heard was necessary even
though the garnishment was only an interim deprivation; final deprivation would not occur until after a trial in court.
Although the language of Sniadach might be read as limiting the
requirement of an opportunity to be heard to cases involving wages, the
Supreme Court resolved this ambiguity in 1972 in Fuentes v. Shevin. 0
In Fuentes the Court extended the Sniadach requirement, holding summary seizure of goods under a writ of replevin to be unconstitutional.
The concept of procedural due process, however, became somewhat
confused in 1974 when the Court, in Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co.,27
upheld a Louisiana sequestration procedure that was similar in many
ways to the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin statutes struck down in
Fuentes. In Mitchell, like Fuentes, the creditor held a security interest
in the goods. However, several specific factors in Mitchell purportedly
led the Court to distinguish Fuentes. In Mitchell the creditor would lose
his lien if the buyer transferred possession (possible if prior notice were
given), the writ of sequestration was issued only by a judge and only
upon the showing of specific facts, and there was an opportunity for an
immediate postseizure hearing at which the creditor had the burden of
proof.2
Although Mitchell attempted to distinguish Fuentes, the
Court actually changed its approach. In Fuentes the Court had said
that the nature of the case might vary the form of the hearing but could
not, absent a specific exigency, 29 postpone the hearing until after the
25. 395 U.S. 337 (1969).
26. 407 U.S. 67 (1972), noted inS1 N.C.L. REV. 111 (1972).
27. 416 U.S. 600 (1974).
28. Absence of this last element led a three-judge federal district court, relying
upon Mitchell, to hold New York's attachment statute unconstitutional. Sugar v. Curtis
Circulation Co., 383 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1974), prob. juris. noted, consolidated with
Carey v. Sugar, 421 U.S. 908 (1975), remanded,96 S. Ct. 1208 (1976).
29. Specific exigencies suggested by the Court were situations in which postponing
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seizure. Mitchell in effect held that the nature of the case might
determine the time of the hearing.
Although some thought Mitchell had effectively overruled
Fuentes, 0 the Court severely restricted the holding of Mitchell in North
Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.31 North Georgia, which
involved the garnishment of a debtor's funds held by a bank, found the'
Georgia garnishment statute unconstitutional for failing to require notice and a hearing. The Court relied on Sniadach and Fuentes and
distinguished Mitchell on the grounds that in North Georgia the affidavit necessary for the writ of garnishment "need[ed to] contain only
conclusory allegations" (instead of in Mitchell "clearly setting out the
facts entitling the creditor to sequestration"), the "writ [was] issuable
. . .by the court clerk" (instead of in Mitchell by a judge), and there
was "no provision for an early hearing at which the creditor would be
required to demonstrate at least probable cause for the garnishment."32
North Georgia thus appeared to reaffirm as the general rule the
Fuentes requirement of notice and an opportunity to be heard. Mitchell
might be distinguished from North Georgia as setting the requirements
when both the debtor and creditor already have rights in the specific
property, i.e. when the creditor holds a security interest in the property.13 North Georgia,however, did not rely on this distinction. Instead,
it distinguished Mitchell on the grounds noted above. Thus one commentator argues that North Georgia in some ways adopted the Mitchell
rationale that a pre-seizure hearing is not mandatory when other protections, including an "early" hearing, are imposed, and that it thereby
paved the way for the extension of Mitchell to unsecured creditor
situations. 4 Whether this will be the development of the law or whethnotice and a hearing were necessary to protect the public against immediate harm, to
secure (quasi in rem) jurisdiction, or to keep the debtor from destroying or concealing
the goods. The Court, however, said these situations "must be truly unusual," and the
statute must be "narrowly drawn." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-93 & n.23 (1972).
Mitchell could be explained on the basis that the danger of lien expiration upon transfer
of possession was an exigency, but the case does not place primary importance on this
fact, and the language in Fuentes does not seem to support the notion of such a
generalized exigency.
30. See Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600, 623 (Powell, J., concurring),
634-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (1974).
31. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
32. Id. at 607.
33. The Mitchell decision emphasized this fact. 416 U.S. at 604. North Georgia
involved an unsecured creditor. Note, however, that Fuentes, like Mitchell, involved a
secured creditor.
34. Catz & Robinson, Due Process and Creditor's Remedies: From Sniadach and
Fuentes to Mitchell, North Georgia and Beyond, 28 RuTrnms L. Rav. 541, 563-64
(1975).
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er Mitchell will be considered a very special situation and be restricted to
its facts remains to be seen. 5
The opportunity to be heard in the debtor context would be
incomplete without adequate notice. In Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. 6 the United States Supreme Court recognized that
procedural due process requires that the parties affected be given "notice
reasonably calculated . . . to apprise [them] of the pendency of the

action. ' 37 Mullane held that due process required that personal notice,
not merely notice by publication, be given to beneficiaries of a trust fund
whose addresses were known before a judicial settlement of accounts.
The United States Supreme Court has also tightened the requirements for finding a waiver of due process rights by the debtor. Waiver of
a notice and hearing by the signing of a cognovit note was upheld in D.H.
Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co. 8 at least partly because the debtor was a
corporation, indicating business sophistication, and had received concessions in exchange for the waiver, indicating awareness of the waiver's
significance and a bargaining over terms. In Fuentes v. Shevin 9 the
Court found that the language in the conditional sales contracts40 did
not constitute a valid waiver for the reasons that
There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the parties
who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining power....
The appellees made no showing whatever that the appellants were
actually aware or made aware of the significance of the fine print
now relied upon as a waiver of constitutional rights.
The contracts included nothing about the waiver of a
prior hearing. They did not indicate how 4or through what process
...the seller could take back the goods. 1

The concept of procedural due process is based on the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution,
which applies only to actions by states.42 A finding of state action is
35. The Supreme Court noted probable jurisdiction in Carey v. Sugar, 421 U.S. 908
(1975), involving the constitutionality of New York's attachment statute. The case was
remanded for state court construction of New York law. Carey v. Sugar, 96 S. Ct. 1208
(1976).
36. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
37. Id. at 314.
38. 405 U.S. 174 (1972). See also Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
39. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
40. The language provided that the creditors "'may take back'" or "'may retake'
or 'repossess' the merchandise." Id. at 94.
41. Id. at 95-96.
42. "[Ior shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law . . . ." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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therefore necessary before due process requirements will exist. 43 State
action may be present when state law provides the basis for a deprivation or when state officials are involved in the deprivation. 4" Courts
have used several theories to find "indirect" state action. When a
private party performs a traditional government function--issuing town
ordinances, 45 conducting a "pre-primary" for electing government officials,46 or managing a public park47-- courts have found state action.48
State action may be found when the government's presence becomes so
pervasive that the government is a joint participant in the activity, as
when a person operates a restaurant within a government owned parking facility in space leased to him by the government. 49 The mere
presence of the government, however, is not always sufficient to constitute such a "symbiotic relationship" necessary for finding state
action.50 State encouragement of private discriminatory conduct has
been a basis for state action. Such was the case in Reitman v. Mulkey51
when that court found that a constitutional amendment, which forbade
the state to restrict a person's right to decline to sell or lease realty,
encouraged private discrimination. This holding, however, was based
on the facts that the encouragement was a constitutional provision,
which had reversed prior law (fair housing legislation). State action
has also been found in judicial enforcement of racially restrictive covenants,52 although this rationale has not been broadly extended. 58
Although attempts have been made to apply these rationales to
power of sale foreclosures, courts in at least five jurisdictions54 in the
past few years have refused to find state action in power of sale
43. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11 (1883). The due process clause of the fifth
amendment applies to the federal government.
44. See, e.g., United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17 (1960) (based on the fifteenth
amendment).
45. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
46. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (based on the fifteenth amendment).
47. Evans v. Newton, 382 U.S. 296 (1966).
48. E.g., cases cited notes 45-47 supra.
49. Burton v. Wilmington Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961).
50. See Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163 (1972), where the Court
refused to apply the equal protection clause to a private club serving liquor merely
because the state regulated liquor licenses.
51. 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
52. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
53. See Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428, 438 (Mo. 1975);
Note, State Action. Theories for Applying Constituetional Restrictions to Private
Activity, 74 CoLUM. L. Ray. 656, 677-80 (1974).
54. California, District of Columbia, Georgia, Missouri, and Texas. See note 55,
infra.

910

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54

foreclosures. 55 Powers of sale were not derived from statutes but
instead existed prior to the enactment of state statutes regulating foreclosures. 56 The duties of a clerk, a state official, have been seen as
insignificant. 57 Foreclosure has not been seen as a traditional government function.58 Nor have these courts found sufficient "entanglement" by the state to constitute state action.59 Reitman v. Mulkey has
been distinguished from the power of sale context because in that case
the constitutional provision encouraged what had been forbidden, whereas powers of sale existed before foreclosure statutes, which in fact
tended to restrict the powers rather than encourage them. 0 Courts
have also refused to find state action in judicial enforcement of the
power of sale.61 In general, these courts have found that "[sltatutes
and laws regulate many forms of purely private activity, such as contractual relations . . . , and subjecting all behavior that conforms to state

law to the Fourteenth Amendment would emasculate the state action
concept. '' ea
Before Turner, only federal court decisions in Michigan expressly
supported a finding of state action in power of sale foreclosure proceedings. Garner v. Tri-State Development Co.63 found state action present
in statutory provisions which encouraged private discriminatory conduct, and the "largely ministerial" participation of the sheriff and regis55. Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511 (D.C. Cir. 1974);

Global Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379 (N.D. Ga. 1974); U.S. Hertz, Inc. v.
Niobrara Farms, 41 Cal. App. 3d 68, 116 Cal. Rptr. 44 (Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Coffey
Enterprises Realty & Dev. Co. v. Holmes, 233 Ga. 937, 213 S.E.2d 882 (1975); Federal
Nat'I Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. 1975); Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519
S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).

InBeaton v. Land Court,

-

Mass.

-,

326 N.E.2d

302, 307 n.6 (1975), the court stated, "The substantial and growing weight of authority
in apparently analogous areas suggests that in fact no 'state action' is present in such
foreclosures," and cited Turner v. Blackburn as an example of "[s]ome authority, now
apparently dwindling,.. . which finds 'state action' ... "
56. U.S. Hertz, Inc. v. Niobrara Farms, 41 Cal. App. 3d 68, 116 Cal. Rptr. 44, 57
(Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428, 431-32
(Mo. 1975).
57. See, e.g., Global Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D. Ga.
1974).
58. See, e.g., Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511, 515 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
59. See, e.g., id. at 514.
60. See, e.g., Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428, 435 (Mo.
1975); Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673, 677-78 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
61. See, e.g., Global Indus., Inc. v. Harris, 376 F. Supp. 1379, 1383 (N.D. Ga.
1974); Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428, 437-38 (Mo. 1975).
62. Adams v. Southern Cal. First Natl Bank, 492 F.2d 324, 330-31 (9th Cir.
1973), quoted in Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511, 514 (D.C.
Cir. 1974).
63. 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
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ter of deeds.64 Northrip v. Federal National Mortgage Association6 5
rejected the latter basis but found state action based on statutory encour66
agement.
ANALYSIS OF TURNER

If state action is, for the sake of argument, assumed to be present
in Turner v. Blackburn, the decision seems fairly consistent with the

prior Supreme Court cases in its findings that notice and a hearing are
required and that there was no waiver. Although Sniadach, Fuentes,
Mitchell, and North Georgia dealt with personal property, by analogy
due process should require the same kind of notice and opportunity to
be heard or knowing waiver in the real estate context. Thus, federal

courts are becoming involved in an area (real estate) traditionally left to
the states. Foreclosure by power of sale involves a permanent depriva-

tion of property, whereas the above cases potentially involved only a
temporary deprivation. 7 The due process requirements in the real
estate context should therefore be at least as strict. As noted before, the

North Carolina foreclosure procedure did not require personal notice of
the sale.

This conflicts with the personal notice requirements of Mul-

lane v. CentralHanover Bank & Trust Co. 68 There was no requirement
or opportunity for a pre-sale hearing, unless the debtor instituted an

action for an injunction. 69 Even this right would be meaningless if the
debtor did not have notice of the sale.70 In any case, such a right does
not appear to be a sufficient opportunity for a hearing under Sniadach,
Fuentes, Mitchell, and North Georgia,71 although such an argument
64. Id. at 379.
65. 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich. 1974).
66. Id. at 596-97.
67. In Fuentes, the Pennsylvania statute did not require the creditor to institute suit
following the replevin, but the Florida statute did so require. 407 U.S. at 74, 77.
Garnishment, involved in Sniadach and North Georgia, normally anticipates a trial
following the garnishment. Likewise, the sequestration procedure of Louisiana involved
in Mitchell normally contemplates a subsequent suit.
68. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
69. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.34 (Supp. 1975) provides for an injunction or
temporary restraining order upon application and the posting of bond. A right to seek
such an injunction or order existed even without this statutory section, see, e.g., Bolich v.
Prudential Ins. Co., 202 N.C. 789, 791, 164 S.E. 335, 336 (1932); Capehart v. Kader
Biggs & Co., 77 N.C. 261 (1877), and would exist in most debtor-creditor cases. Section
45-21.34 was enacted in 1933 partly to reverse the rule of Bolich v. PrudentialIns. Co.,
supra, that equity would not enjoin a sale merely because a general depression would
cause the property to be sold at an inadequate price. A Survey of Statutory Changes in
North Carolinain 1933, 11 N.C.L. Rav. 191, 240-41 (1933).
70. Cf. Tamer v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. 1250, 1259 (1975).
71. In Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C. 1975), the court ruled a sale
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Even if Mitchell sets forth the applicable standard,

either because it applies to transactions involving secured creditors (as
in a foreclosure) or because it has been implicitly adopted as the general
standard, 72 its requirements were not met. There was no provision for
an early hearing; indeed, there was no provision for any hearing (except
an injunction hearing"S).

In addition, the safeguards surrounding the

issuance of a writ in Mitchell were not present since there was no writ or
order. Nor was there any requirement that the creditor furnish security
for the payment of damages the debtor might sustain, as in Fuentes, 4
Mitchell,75 and North Georgia.7" Moreover, in holding that language in
the deed of trust did not constitute a sufficient waiver, the court in
77
Turnerproperly found many analogies to Fuentes.
Turner v. Blackburn is ambiguous, however, with respect to
whether a hearing is required or merely an opportunity for a hearing7 (and, if the latter, whether the burden may be placed upon the

mortgagor to request a hearing). 79 Fuentes indicates that only an
opportunity for a hearing is required: "[N]o hearing need be held
under the mechanic's lien statute to be unconstitutional, calling the seeking of a
temporary restraining order or an injunction to be "extraordinary remedies" and not
sufficient protection. Id. at 649.
72. See text accompanying note 34 supra.
73. See notes 69-71 and accompanying text supra.
74. 407 U.S. at 73 n.6, 75-76 n.7.
75. 416 U.S. at 621.
76. 419 U.S. at 602 n.1.
77. See text accompanying notes 39-41 supra. The deed of trust in Turner did,
however, indicate the process of deprivation more fully than the contract in Fuentes.
Compare Turner v. Blackburn, 389 F. Supp. at 1255 n.24, with Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. at 94-96.
78. Compare "we hold that a hearing prior to foreclosure and sale is essential," 389
F. Supp. at 1259, with "foreclosure. . . is. . .unlawful. . . unless.., there has been
• . .opportunity for a hearing," 389 F. Supp. at 1261.
79. One writer has felt that due process in foreclosures could be satisfied if the
notice to the debtor informed him that he could request a hearing and then placed
the burden on the debtor to so request. Comment, Mortgages-Does Foreclosure Under
Power of Sale Violate Due Process Rights?, 4 CumtELANiD-SAMFORD L. REv. 507,
523 & n.81 (1974). This might be supported by language in Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67, 93 n.29 (1972), quoted in text accompanying note 80 infra. In fact,
in Ross v. Brown Title Corp., 356 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. La.), af'd mem., 412 U.S.
934 (1973), the court upheld the Louisiana executory process procedure, similar
to foreclosure, in which the debtor is given notice of sale and then has "thirtythree days in which to take the steps necessary to obtain a hearing. . . ." Id. at 601.
Cf. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-4 (Supp. 1975), which does place the burden of requesting a
hearing upon the debtor before a sale to satisfy a mechanic's lien. But cf. Garner v. TriState Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377, 380 (E.D. Mich. 1974), where the court held that
Fuentes requires not only a notice of sale but also a notice of hearing. See also Buckner
v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 901 (1974).
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unless the defendant, having received notice of his opportunity, takes
advantage of it."8

The most questionable part of the Turner decision is the court's
finding of state action. Although mentioning other theories, the court
in Turner apparently based its finding of state action solely upon the

direct participation by the clerk of the superior court.8 1

This was

perhaps the most promising theory of state action,8 2 but the court

overemphasized the clerk's role in North Carolina.
Participation by the clerk in what was formerly a purely contrac-

tual matter-foreclosure sale under power of sale-was imposed by
statute in North Carolina in 191583 when the upset bid statute was
enacted.

4

This statute, enacted to give mortgagors additional protec-

5

tion, required the clerk to order a resale upon the filing of an increased
bid with him within ten days of the sale, and, following the resale, "the
clerk shall issue his order [requiring] the mortgagee . . . to make title
* * "s" Under the original statute, unless there was an upset bid, the
clerk had no jurisdiction and no report needed to be filed with the

clerk.

7

Under the present statute, a preliminary report is necessary to

begin the running of the ten-day upset bid period,"8 and -the clerk may
compel the filing of this report.89 Otherwise, the clerk appears to have
80. Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 93 n.29 (1972). Since Fuentes also refers to
"the requirement of a prior hearing," id. at 97, the term "hearing" apparently refers
merely to the "opportunity for a hearing."
81. 389 F. Supp. at 1254-58. The decision mentioned but did not consider other
theories: judicial enforcement, symbiotic relationship, statutory encouragement, and
delegation of a traditional government function. See id. at 1254-55 n.20.
82. See text accompanying notes 44-66 supra for a discussion of the other theories.
83. Ch. 146, [1915] N.C. Public Laws, subsequently codified as N.C. CONSOL.
STAT. § 2591 (1919).
The clerk had previously been given minor duties with respect to
other aspects of deeds of trust. E.g., ch. 128, [19051 N.C. Public Laws, now N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 45-6 (1966); ch. 188, [1869-1870] N.C. Public Laws, now N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 45-9 (1966).
84. Ch. 146, [19151 N.C. Public Laws, subsequently codified as N.C. CONSOL.
STAT. § 2591 (1919).
This statute later became N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-28 (1943), and
since the 1949 revision of the foreclosure statutes is now N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.27
through -21.29 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
85. The statute extended to mortgagors in power of sale foreclosures protection
similar to that in judicial foreclosures, in which a court of equity could decree a resale
upon deposit of a raised bid. Pringle v. Winston-Salem Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 182 N.C.
316, 317, 108 S.E. 914 (1921).
86. N.C. CONSOL. STAT. § 2591 (1919). This order, however, was said to be
"merely ministerial in its nature, and its omission. . . does not invalidate the foreclosure." Cheek v. Squires, 200 N.C. 661, 668, 158 S.E. 198, 202 (1931).
87. In re Sermon's Land, 182 N.C. 122, 128, 108 S.E. 497, 499 (1921).
88. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-21.26 to -21.27 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
89. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.14 (1966).
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had, when Turner was decided, no jurisdiction over the foreclosure unless
an upset bid was filed (or surplus proceeds were deposited with the
clerk90).91 When there is no upset bid, there is no requirement that the
clerk confirm the sale.92 Although the filing of a final report is
required, 93 it appears that failure to file a final report would not in itself
affect the validity of the foreclosure.94
The court in Turner v. Blackburn emphasized not only the filing of
the preliminary report and the clerk's "administration of the upset bid
provisions," but also stated that the essentials of the sale "are subject to
explicit verification by the clerk under § 43-21.26." 95 Although the
clerk may verify such items, nothing in the statute imposes such authority upon him.9e The court also stated that "without a showing of
personal notice to the mortgagor of the property, the disposition of the
proceeds of the sale must be approved by the clerk."1"7 This statement
also is not supported by the statutes. 98 The court emphasized the
clerk's role in issuing orders for possession,99 but this seems to imply no
more state action in the foreclosure setting than would an eviction order
imply state action in a simple conveyance of property by deed.
Thus it appears that the clerk's role in foreclosures in which there
is no upset bid is negligible and not sufficient to constitute state action. 00 However, if one accepts the court's reasoning that state action
is found in the clerk's administration of the upset bid procedure,' 0 ' its
refusal to "examine the various elements of the foreclosure proceeding
as disparate bits and pieces"'1 2 avoids the awkwardness of requiring
90. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-21.31 to -21.32 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
91. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Sanders, 264 N.C. 234, 243, 141 S.E.2d 329, 335
(1965); In re Register Property, 5 N.C. App. 29, 35, 167 S.E.2d 802, 807 (1969).
92. Certain-Teed Prods. Corp. v. Sanders, 264 N.C. 234, 244, 141 S.E.2d 329, 336
(1965), codified in N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.29A (Supp. 1975); Britt v. Smith, 6 N.C.
App. 117, 122, 169 S.E.2d 482, 486 (1969). N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.33(b) (1966)
does provide that the clerk shall audit the final account.
93. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.33 (1966).
94. Cheek v. Squires, 200 N.C. 661, 669, 158 S.E. 198, 202 (1931); cf. Britt v.
Britt, 26 N.C. App. 132, 135-36, 215 S.E.2d 172, 174-75, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 238, 217
S.E.2d 678 (1975).
95. 389 F. Supp. at 1256.
96. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.26 (1966).
97. 389 F. Supp. at 1257 (emphasis in original).
98. It also seems contrary to implications of the statutes and court decisions. See
cases and statutes cited notes 90-92 and accompanying text supra.
99. 389 F. Supp. at 1257.
100. See id. at 1262-63 (Jones, J.,
dissenting).
101. Id. at 1256-57.
102. Id. at 1258.
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notice and a hearing only in cases in which (and after) an upset bid is
filed.

Turner v. Blackburn is one of the first cases clearly to hold a power
of sale foreclosure procedure to be unconstitutional. Turner's present
impact on the country does not seem so great when it is remembered

that this holding places Turner in the minority of decisions on power of
sale foreclosures.

gia, 104

Missouri,

03

05

Subsequent decisions in the state courts of Geor-

and Texas,' 016 and a Fifth Circuit decision consider-

ing the Texas procedure' 0 7 did not follow Turner. Even the North
Carolina Court of Appeals, in Britt v. Britt,'0 8 refused to follow Turner.

Nevertheless, Turner may later be seen as the beginning of a trend.
There are approximately twenty-six jurisdictions that statutorily sanction power of sale foreclosure, 0 9 and Turner could have a substantial influence on courts that consider the constitutionality of those notice

procedures.

Although the proposed Uniform Land Transactions Act

and the proposed Federal Mortgage Foreclosure Act provide for personal notice to the debtor and to junior lienholders, neither act provides for

a hearing,"x0 and thus would be constitutionally suspect under Turner.
103. Only Northrip v. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n, 372 F. Supp. 594 (E.D. Mich.
1974), also clearly held a particular power of sale foreclosure procedure to be unconstitutional. Garner v. Tri-State Dev. Co., 382 F. Supp. 377 (E.D. Mich. 1974), held that
the procedure violated due process absent a waiver, but, since a commercial debtor was
involved, the court held that the waiver contained sufficient language on its face to be
effective. Law v. United States Dep't of Agr., 366 F. Supp. 1233 (N.D. Ga. 1973),
basing its opinion upon fifth amendment due process and thereby avoiding the state
action question, id. at 1234, denied summary judgment so that the validity of the waiver
could be judged. Similarly, Ruff v. Lee, 230 Ga. 426, 197 S.E.2d 376 (1973), upheld the
denial of summary judgment. Bryant v. Jefferson Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 509 F.2d 511
(D.C. Cir. 1974), held that even if there were state action, the foreclosure statute would
not be unconstitutional on its face. In Logan v. Short, 342 F. Supp. 1349 (E.D. Mo.
1972), the federal court abstained pending construction of the statute by a state court.
The Louisiana executory process procedure, similar to foreclosure, was upheld in Ross v.
Brown Title Corp., 356 F. Supp. 595 (E.D. La.), aff'd mem., 412 U.S. 934 (1973), and
in Buckner v. Carmack, 272 So. 2d 326 (La. 1973), appeal dismissed, 417 U.S. 901
(1974). Finally, many decisions have upheld power of sale foreclosures on the basis
that no state action was involved. See cases cited note 55 supra.
104. Coffey Enterprises Realty & Dev. Co. v. Holmes, 233 Ga. 937, 213 S.E.2d 882
(1975).
105. Federal Nat'l Mtg. Ass'n v. Howlett, 521 S.W.2d 428 (Mo. 1975).
106. Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975).
107. Barrera v. Security Bldg. & Inv. Corp., 519 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1975).
108. 26 N.C. App. 132, 215 S.E.2d 172, cert. denied, 288 N.C. 238, 217 S.E.2d 678
(1975).
109. Madway & Pearlman, Mortgage Forms and Foreclosure Practices: Time for
Reform, 9 REAL PROP., PROBATE AND TRuST J. 560, 564 (1974). These jurisdictions are
listed and their statutes cited in Madway, A Mortgage ForeclosurePrimer, 8 CLEARINGHOUSE RIv. 146, 170-72 (1974).
110. Pedowitz, Current Developments in Summary Foreclosure, 9 REAL PROP.,
PROBATE AND TRusr J. 421 (1974).
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Ironically, the statutory provisions that were enacted by North
Carolina to protect mortgagors-the provisions for upset bids and for
the filing of the preliminary and final reports-caused the foreclosure

procedure to be declared unconstitutional. Had the court declared the
statutes per se unconstitutional, the situation feared by another court
might have resulted: contractual power of sale might have continued
without any statutory protections."' As it was, the dilemma faced by
attorneys in North Carolina following Turner was alleviated by the
passage of substantial amendments 1

2

to the foreclosure statutes on June

6, 1975. The amendments are effective from that date except as to
foreclosures or litigation commenced prior to that date."'
THE NEW AMENDMENTS TO THE FORECLOSURE STATUTES

The new amendments insert a new section 45-21.16, which provides for a hearing to be held before the clerk of the superior court prior
to the foreclosure sale."14 The designation of a clerk to conduct the
hearing is somewhat suspect in light of the United States Supreme
Court's opinion in North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc."'
The Court there struck down the Georgia garnishment statute partly
because the procedure was overseen by a clerk instead of by a judge as
in Mitchell.". 6 The North Carolina statutory amendments try to counteract such an attack by their recital that the clerk's act "is a judicial act
and may be appealed to the judge .. . " Support for the argument
that this provision will be an effective defense to a North Georgia
challenge can be found in Hutchison v. Bank of North Carolina,N.A. 118

In that case, the actions of the clerk in deciding whether to issue a writ
of attachment under the North Carolina attachment statute 10 were held
111. Armenta v. Nussbaum, 519 S.W.2d 673, 679 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975). With the
statutes declared unconstitutional, there would seem to be no state action to support
requirements of notice and a hearing.
112. Ch. 492, [1975] N.C. Sess. Laws, codified as N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.9,
-21.16, -21.16A, -21.17, -21.21, -21.29, -21.30, -21.33, -21.45 (Supp. 1975).
113. Ch.492, H9 13, 16, & 17, [1975] N.C. Sess. Laws.
114. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1975); cf. the 1973 amendments to the
claim and delivery statute providing for a hearing, id. §§ 1-474, -474.1, and the 1975
amendments to the mechanic's lien statute providing for opportunity for a hearing, id.
§ 44A-4. The latter were prompted by Caesar v. Kiser, 387 F. Supp. 645 (M.D.N.C.
1975). See note 4 supra.
115. 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
116. Id. at 607. Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See text
accompanying note 32 supra.
117. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1975).
118. 392 F. Supp. 888 (M.D.N.C. 1975).
119. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-440.5 (Supp. 1975).
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to be judicial actions and thus not in violation of the standard for
constitutionality enunciated in North Georgia. 20 Indeed, Turner v.
Blackburn spoke of a "showing before the clerk or similar neutral

official."' 21
By providing that the clerk make certain findings, the statutory
amendments seem to preclude a mere default judgment; instead the
trustee must present enough affirmative evidence to enable the clerk to
find "the existence of (i) valid debt of which the party seeking to
foreclose is the holder, (ii) default, (iii) right to foreclose under the
instrument, and (iv) notice to those entitled to such ...
22 This
conclusion is enforced by the provision indicating that a hearing cannot
2
be waived by lapse of time, but instead must be affirmatively waived.' 3
The requirement that evidence be presented is desirable in light of North
Georgia's distinguishing of Mitchell on the ground that in Mitchell the

affidavit had to "[go] beyond mere conclusory allegations and clearly
[set] out the facts," in contrast to the affidavit of "conclusory allegations" in North Georgia. 24 Of course, the standards would be stricter
in cases such as those in which the debtor has no opportunity to appear.
The North Carolina statute, however, is unfortunately unclear as to how

"conclusory" the evidence can be. Hopefully, clerks will require attor-

neys to present evidence "setting out the facts" in order to avoid attacks

on the constitutionality of the procedure.
The North Carolina claim and delivery statute also provides for a
prior hearing. 25 The constitutionality of that hearing was made sus120. North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc., 419 U.S. 601 (1975).
121. 389 F. Supp. at 1259. However, support for this statement can be found not in
the Court's opinion in North Georgia, but instead in Powell's concurring opinion and
Blackmun's dissenting opinion in that case. 419 U.S. at 611 & n.3, 619. Moreover,
Powell justified his choice of a "neutral officer" not necessarily a judge by the statement,
"The basic protection required for the debtor is the assurance of a prompt postgarnishment hearing before a judge." Id. at 611 n.3. Fuentes, the case cited in Turner at this
point, does not discuss this issue, but merely says that the nature and form of the
hearings "are legitimately open to many potential variations." Fuentes v. Shevin, 407
U.S. 67, 96 (1972).
Cf. Remarks by James M. Pedowitz, United Title Ins. Co. Seminar on Foreclosure,
April 4, 1975, which suggested that the hearing should be before a judicial official if an
actual defense is raised; otherwise the hearing may be before a clerk.
122. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1975).
123. Id. § 45-21.16(f). Thus the statute requires more than the opportunity for a
hearing. See notes 78-80 and accompanying text supra for a discussion of the uncertainty (which the statute avoids) about what is constitutionally required.
124. 419 U.S. at 607.
125. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 1-474, -474.1 (Supp. 1975).
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pect by the decision of Wachovia Bank & Trust Co., N.A. v. Smith, 120
which held that a debtor could not raise in this hearing the defenses of
revocation of acceptance of the goods or the retention of a security
interest in them. If this holding were extended to deny the debtor the
right to raise similar substantive defenses in foreclosure hearings, the
constitutionality of the new procedure would be threatened, as protection of the debtor would be greatly diminished. At least two theories
support the non-extension of this holding to foreclosure hearings. First,
unlike claim and delivery in which the case is eventually heard on its
1 the foreclosure hearing is generally the last hearing. Secondmerits, 27
ly, the foreclosure statutory amendments are more explicit in setting
forth what the clerk must find than are the claim and delivery provi-

sions.

128

The new amendments provide only one method of waiving a
hearing. Waiver must be on a form mailed by the clerk upon request

after service of the notice of hearing. 129 This eliminates the constitutional problem of whether a waiver of hearing in the original deed of

trust is valid-under the statute it is not. The statutory procedure is
also beneficial by making it more likely that the waiver is "voluntarily,
intelligently, and knowingly"'

130

made. 3'

The new amendments provide for notice of the hearing to be
126. 24 N.C. App. 133, 210 S.E.2d 212 (1974), cert. denied, 286 N.C. 420, 211
S.E.2d 801 (1975).
127. See id. at 135, 210 S.E.2d at 213.
128. Compare N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(d) (Supp. 1975) with id. §§ 1-474,
-474.1.
129. Id. § 45-21.16(f). This provision is similar to the waiver provision in the
claim and delivery statute. Id. § 1-474.1(b). The waiver provision in the version of the
bill first passed by the House read in part as follows: "No hearing before the clerk shall
be required as to any persons entitled to notice [of hearing] who execute and deliver to
the trustee or mortgagee a duly acknowledged written waiver of their right to notice and
hearing as herein provided, which waiver shall acknowledge the right of the mortgagee to
foreclose without such notice and hearing . . . ." H. 445 Committee Sub., Adopted
5/13/75, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. § 2 (§ 45-21.16(f)). This waiver provision
was replaced in the final version by the provision in the original House and Senate bills.
See H. 445 and S.345, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess. § 1 (§ 45-21.16(c)). Cf. S.
733, N.C. Gen. Assembly, 1975 Sess., which was similar to the enacted statute but
contained no waiver provision.
Presumably, waivers not sent by the clerk executed in foreclosure proceedings begun
prior to June 6, 1975, were valid if they met the constitutional requirements. This
conclusion would especially apply to a waiver executed by a debtor after default, since
the debtor would be more likely to recognize the significance of this separate waiver than
one incorporated into the deed of trust.
130. See D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 187 (1972).
131. Cf. the method of waiver of hearing by lapse of time found in the 1975
mechanic's lien statutory amendments. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44A-4 (Supp. 1975).
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served upon the current record owners of the property at least ten days
before the hearing. 3 ' Prior owners must also be served in order for the
noteholder to recover any deficiency from them. 3 3 The methods of
service are those provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure for the service
of summons.'3 4 In addition, if the party cannot be located, the notice
may be posted on the property.' 35 The statutory provisions indicate
that the notice must remain posted upon the property throughout the ten
day period immediately preceding the hearing. Continuous checking
on the notice would not seem to be required, however, by analogy to
3 6 in which the
Carson v. Fleming,"
court held that "the trustee has a
right to presume that [foreclosure sale notices] remained posted during
the required period of time.' 3 7 It is uncertain whether notice by
posting on the property is sufficient notice to a person no longer an
owner of the property to satisfy due process requirements. Thus, when
there is no service except by posting, such a person may be not liable for
deficiencies. The statutory amendments provide a detailed list of information that must be included in the notice of hearing.'38 In addition, if
the information required to be included in the notice of sale 3 9 is
included in the notice of hearing, no further notice of sale need be sent
40
to those receiving the notice of hearing.
Following the hearing, 14 the notice of sale must be posted at the
courthouse and published as before, except that the lengths of time have
been reduced from thirty days to twenty days for posting and from four
132. Id. §§ 45-21.16(a)-(b).

133. Id. § 45-21.16(b)(2).
134. Id. § 45-21.16(a). The methods of service are set forth in N.C.R. Crv. P. 4. It
appears that the provision in section 45-21.16(a) for alternative service by registered or
certified mail has been made superfluous by the addition of similar provisions to N.C.R.
Cirv. P. 4(j). It is arguable, however, that "actual delivery by registered or certified
mail, return receipt requested," under section 45-21.16(a), has a broader meaning than,
for example, "mailing a copy. . . , registered or certified mail, return receipt requested,
addressed to the party to be served, and delivering to the addressee only," N.C.R. Civ. P.

4(j) (1)(c).
135. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(a) (Supp. 1975); N.C.R. Civ. P. 4(j) (9) (c).
136. 188 N.C. 600, 125 S.E. 259 (1924).
137. Id. at 602, 125 S.E. at 260.
138. N.C.GN. STAT. § 45-21.16(c) (Supp. 1975).
139. Id. § 45-21.16A, formerly § 45-21.16 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
140. Id. § 45-21.17(4) (Supp. 1975).
141. The statute is not completely clear as to whether the notice of sale may be
posted and published before the hearing. However, the provision in id. § 45-21.16(d)
that, if the clerk at the hearing finds the existence of certain facts, he "shall further find
that the . . . trustee can proceed .

. .

. and the . . . trustee can give notice of and

conduct a sale. . ." indicates that posting and publication of the notice of sale must
await the outcome of the hearing.
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weeks to two weeks for publication,1 42 unless the deed of trust specifies
longer periods of time. 43 This reduction is presumably intended partially to offset the newly imposed prehearing time. The notice of sale
must also be mailed to (not necessarily served upon) parties entitled to
receive the notice of hearing at least twenty days prior to the sale. 44 The
statutory amendments also provide a procedure for allowing anyone else
to request a notice by filing in the office of the register of deeds. This is
apparently intended to protect junior lienholders, who otherwise have no
right to receive a notice of hearing or a notice of sale, although the
14 5
provision is not expressly so limited.
The notice of sale under section 45-21.16A must contain the same
information as required under prior procedure, except that the notice
must additionally contain the names of the original mortgagors, the
names of the present owners, and recording data, and the description
of the property may need to be more complete. Under the amendments,
the description must be "reasonably calculated to inform the public as to
what is being sold." Thus, a street address may be advisable. The statute also states, "Describe the real property (including improvements
thereon). . . ." Hence, a description such as "property. . .consisting
of a house and lot" (or "a lot and buildings") may be minimally required. Perhaps even more is needed-the statute is rather ambiguous
46
on this point.1
The statutory amendments add new requirements for notice if a
sale is postponed. 147 If there is a resale, notice of the resale must again
be mailed to parties entitled to the notice of sale, but the statute is
unclear whether this must be done twenty days before the resale.'4 8
142. Id. § 45-21.17(1) (Supp. 1975), amending § 45-21.17(b) (1966).
For some reason, the codifiers of the 1975 statute changed the designations of the
subsections in section 45-21.17 from those set out in the statute as enacted. Thus section
45-21.17(a)(2)a. of the Session Laws became section 45-21.17(1)b.1. A similar difference is found in section 45-21.29(k) in which the Session Laws inserted a new
subdivision (2) and renumbered subdivisions (2) through (6) as subdivisions (.)
through (7), but the codifiers merely designated the new subdivision as (2a).
143. Id. § 45-21.17 (Supp. 1975). The deed of trust can only extend, not diminish,
the lengths of time, in contrast to the former statute, id. § 45-21.17(a)-(b) (1966).
144. Id. § 45-21.17(4) (Supp. 1975).
145. Id. §§ 45-21.17(4)-(5), designated as sections 45-21.17(d)-(e) in the Session
Laws (see note 142 supra).
146. Id. § 45-21.16A, formerly id. § 45-21.16 (1966), as amended, (Supp. 1974).
147. See id. §§ 45-21.21(b), (d) (Supp. 1975).
148. Presumably not. Id. § 45-21.29(b) (3) states, "Notice of resale shall be mailed
to each party entitled to notice of sale pursuant to G.S. 45-21.17."
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A SUGGESTED PROCEDURE
Since the trustee's duties under the new statute are more complicat-

attorney, the following basic
ed and may be unfamiliar to the practicing
149
procedure for foreclosures is suggested:
(1) Search the title from the recording of the deed of trust. 150
-(2) Prepare and mail a blank affidavit to the servicer or noteholder requesting completion and return of the affidavit, addresses of

mortgagors (if needed), and other information and documents if needed. This affidavit should state the existence of a valid debt held by the

party seeking to foreclose, the existence of and reason for default, and
whether the maturity of the debt has been accelerated.1 5 1

(3) In counties requiring the filing of a petition or motion for
hearing, prepare such a petition or motion. Although the statute does
not seem to require such a petition or motion, some counties following
passage of the new statute asked that a petition or motion be filed. 152
(4) Prepare a notice of hearing.""
(5) Schedule a hearing with the clerk of the superior court to be
held preferably at least twenty days after the filing of the petition.' 4 Set
the date of sale at least twenty days after the date of the hearing, unless

the deed of trust requires a longer period of time for posting or publication of the notice. 1

5

149. This procedure is merely a suggested one, and need not be followed in all
respects. Also, this procedure may not encompass every detail (such a recording of the
appointment of substitute trustee or drawing of necessary checks for fees). Informing
the noteholder or servicer, or both, of the progress of the foreclosure proceedings at
various points may be desirable and might even be requested.
150. This is necessary to ascertain the current record owner, to whom the new
statute requires notice of hearing to be sent. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(b) (3) (Supp.
1975).
151. This affidavit is needed in the hearing before the clerk. The procedure of
using an affidavit is not mandatory, and in fact the clerk has discretion to require more
to demonstrate a debt and default. Id. § 45-21.16(d). When permitted, the affidavit is
usually simpler than bringing a representative of the servicer or noteholder to the
hearing, and it is questionable whether testimony by a trustee who has no personal
knowledge of the default is sufficient.
152. For example, following passage of the new statute, Guilford County requested
that a petition be filed, whereas a motion was used in some other places, and Randolph
County required neither.
153. This notice must contain the information required by N.C. GEN. STAT. § 4521.16(c) (Supp. 1975), and preferably would include the information required by section
45-21.16A. See text accompanying note 140 supra.
154. The notice of hearing must be served not less than ten days before the hearing,
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.16(a) (Supp. 1975), and time must be allowed for service by
the sheriff (usually given ten days) or for service by mail.
155. See id. § 45-21.17; note 143 and accompanying text supra. The dates of
hearing and sale must be set prior to serving the notice of hearing, since they must be
included in the notice. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 45-21.16(c)(6)-(7) (Supp. 1975).
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(6) File the petition or motion if required. Deliver the petition
or motion15 and notice of hearing to the sheriff to serve, along with a
return of service, or serve by registered or certified mail. 1 7 The
disadvantage of serving by mail is that the debtor may have moved to an
unknown address, which fact is discovered only upon receiving the
returned envelope, at which point the dates of hearing and sale may
have to be reset in order to provide sufficient time for notice.'6 8 If
service is by delivery by the sheriff, he can post the notice on the
property if the party cannot be located.
(7) If service was by mail, execute an affidavit of service upon
receiving the return receipts.
(8) If service was by the sheriff, check the clerk's file to ascertain if there has been good service.
(9) If waiver of the hearing is desired, request the clerk to mail
such waivers to the necessary parties. 59
(10) Update the title search, ascertaining the record owners
on the actual date of service'8 0 and checking for requests for notice of
6

sale.1

1

(11) Execute an affidavit as to the identity of the record owners
162
at the time the notice was served.
(12) Prepare for the hearing by assembling the completed affidavits,1 3 the note, deed of trust, and appointment of substitute trustee,
and prepare an order for the clerk to sign.
(13) Attend the hearing; have the order signed if the clerk finds
that the trustee may proceed. 164
156. Service of the petition does not seem to be required, but probably is preferable
when such a petition exists.
157. The parties to be served are listed in N.C. GEN. STrAT. § 45-21.16(b) (Supp.
1975). The manner of service is set forth in id. § 45-21.16(a).
158. If the original dates are set too far in advauce, the foreclosure will take an
unreasonably long time, with loss of profits, increased possibility of vandalism, etc.
159. See N.C. GEN. STAT. 'I 45-21.16(f) (Supp. 1975).

160. If a new conveyance was recorded between the time of the first title search and

the dates of service, the trustee will have to have the new owners served. See Id. § 4521.16(b) (3).
161. See id. § 45-21.17(5).
162. Instead of an affidavit as to the record owners and an affidavit of service or return of service, the trustee might execute a single affidavit stating conclusively that the
proper parties were served in order to satisfy the clerk that there was "notice to those entitled to such." Id. § 45-21.16(d). However, such a single affidavit would not allow
the clerk to examine the facts as completely.
163. These include the server's affidavit, the affidavit as to record owners, and the
affidavit of service, if applicable.
164. See id. § 45-21.16(d).
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(14) Prepare and post, mail, and have published the notice of
sale as required.1" 5
The mechanics of holding and reporting the sale are generally the
same as those followed prior to 1975,168 except that proof must be
furnished with the final report that all parties entitled were served with
16 7
notices of hearing, sale, and resale.
CONCLUSION

Because of the decision in Turner v. Blackburn, the status of

foreclosures prior to June 6, 1975, (when the statutory amendments
became effective) is somewhat uncertain.

Although Turner purported

to apply prospectively only, 6 8 there is the danger that a later court will
use the principles of Turner to invalidate prior foreclosures. This
danger leads to uncertainty in land titles. Even if Turner is only

applied prospectively, foreclosures between February 12, 1975, (the
date Turner was decided) and June 6, 1975, (the date of the new
amendments) would be affected by the decision. The uncertainty of the

status of foreclosures prior to June 6, 1975, is mitigated by the 1975
amendments, which purport to validate prior foreclosures unless an action is commenced before June 6, 1976.169 If this validation is effective,

70

all can rest easier after that date. In any case, foreclosures,

though attacked, apparently could be upheld in state courts under Britt
172
v. Britt,171 which chose not to follow Turner.

Turner v. Blackburn clearly seems applicable to future foreclosures. Although the state action finding, which was based on the clerk's
functions, seemed somewhat tenuous in Turner, the statutory amend-

ments enacted in response to that case more clearly result in state action.
165. The notice of sale may be prepared before the hearing in order to save time.
See id. § 45-21.17 for requirements of posting, mailing, and publishing the notice of sale.
166. The mechanics of conducting a power of sale foreclosure prior to 1975 can be
found in I.B. LAKE, NORTH CAROLINA PRACTICE METHODS § 177 (1952).
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.33(c)(3) (Supp. 1975).
168. 389 F. Supp. at 1261.
169. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 45-21.45 (Supp. 1975).
170. Although it is doubtful that the General Assembly can completely waive a
constitutional defect (as opposed to a statutory defect), it can perhaps place a statute of
limitations on the bringing of constitutional claims, which it has done here.
171. 26 N.C. App. 132, 215 S.E.2d 172, cert. denied, 28-8 N.C. 238, 217 S.E.2d 678
(1975).
.172. The court in that case said, "We are not unaware of Turner v. Blackburn but
we do not consider that case determinative of this question nor binding on this Court."
Id. at 137, 215 S.E.2d at 176 (citation omitted). Of course, if Turner was prospective
only, by its own terms it would not cover the 1973 foreclosures attacked in Britt v. Britt.
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Thus, with respect to future foreclosures, the basic argument that Turner should not be followed has been mooted by passage of the new
amendments. The new statutory procedure, then, must be tested
against the requirements of due process. The goal of the 1975 statutory
amendments was to provide procedures meeting these requirements. For
the most part, the amendments fulfill this goal. Although designation
of a clerk to conduct the hearing may be Ittacked, the constitutionality
of this designation will probably be upheld. There are, however, some
ambiguities in the wording of the amendments. In at least two areas,
the way is left open for procedures that might not satisfy due process.
There is the danger that evidence presented at the hearing will be
"conclusory" instead of "factual." There is also the danger that the
defenses that the mortgagor can raise at the hearing will be limited.
Although hopefully the new language will not be so construed, the
statute should be more definite on these points. The new procedure is
ambiguous as to the sufficiency of service on prior owners by posting on
the property. This is a constitutional question; but even a determination that such service was insufficient would not affect the major operation of the new procedure. The new amendments are also vague about
what kind of property description in the notice of sale is sufficient, a
question that will probably be resolved by case law. Other ambiguities
may appear with time.
The new procedure may at first seem annoying and overly complex
to attorneys accustomed to simpler and quicker foreclosures. In addition, it may be that mortgagors will seldom appear at the hearings. Any
feeling that the new procedure is overly burdensome, however, will
probably be diminished with the mastery of the new techniques. The
extra time, effort, and expense must be balanced against the need to
protect some mortgagors against unwarranted loss of their lands or
against sales for too low a price. If the ambiguities mentioned above
can be properly resolved, perhaps by further statutory amendment, the
new procedure will cure the deficiencies found by Turner v. Blackburn.
While other states wrestle with the constitutionality of foreclosures,
North Carolina will have a workable solution.
DURANT M. GLOVER

